Can We Do Better? Accountability to Canadians
Introduction
A Canadian Synod, where Canadians deliberate and make decisions about ministry in Canada, would have the following benefits:
- Stronger partnerships across Canada
- Substantive accountability to Canadians, as well as formal accountability
- Remove conflict of interest for board members
- More clear links between priorities and allocation of resources
Most members of Canadian churches feel disconnected from the board that governs ministry in Canada and from the larger Council of Delegates that governs ministry in the denomination. Most do not know who represents them on the Council of Delegates or what they do. Members who are interested in specific areas of national ministry do not know how they can contribute or have any voice in decisions that relate to their field of work or have impacts for Canadian churches. Canadian Ministry Board members complained that the earlier Kitchen Table Conversations included misinformation about how the current system actually works. When that is true and members who are interested cannot find good information or avenues for constructive engagement, it is time to bring the decision-making closer to the people affected by it.
What is the problem?
The current system does not serve the best interests of ministry in Canada as well as a fully controlled Canadian system could. This is true from the conceptual level to the practical level.
At the conceptual level, the current binational governance is based on drawing firm lines between theological deliberations and operations. This is inconsistent with a Reformed emphasis on integration of word and work, something that is especially valued in the Reformational heritage within the Canadian church. Furthermore, experience in Canada shows how theological decisions affect operations, e.g. Indigenous ministries, justice ministries, and now the HSR report.
At the practical level, the current system provides weak accountability to the membership in Canadian churches, and it leads to conflicts of interests that can and should be avoided.
Weak accountability to members of Canadian churches
The Canadian Ministries Board, which governs ministry in Canada, is a subsidiary of the Council of Delegates, which is composed of 70% US members and 30% Canadians. It is only natural that the larger US context shapes its decision-making, with Canada treated as a minority interest or exception on occasion. There have been occasions when a clear majority of Canadian voices on a matter affecting Canada have been over-ruled by a majority US vote, e.g. the vote on a report to restructure binationalism in 2021.
Members of Canadian churches who want to have some input into Canadian ministries are told they should speak to their classis delegate to the Council of Delegates. This person, chosen by delegates at one classis meeting, may or may not be known by church members and the delegate may or may not take forward any suggestions or concerns that they receive or hear. There is no formal and transparent process, such as overtures, that Canadian members can use to have a more meaningful voice in decisions about priorities and directions for ministry in Canada. As another example, the Toward Canada CRC group sent a letter of concern about the future of ministry in Canada, signed by more than 60 church leaders, to the Canadian Ministries Board. They met with the Steering Group, but they could not tell us what process we should use to make a more official request and receive an official response. While concerns are acknowledged, there is no clear way of knowing if they are taken seriously.
There is no clear process of accountability back to members of churches. Appointment of a delegate to the Council of Delegates by a classis is a weak form of accountability when the desired goal is dynamic, shared ministry from local to regional to national levels.
Membership of Canadian Ministries and its Board of Directors
Under the current system, Canadian members of the Council of Delegates are the only members of Canadian Ministries, and they are also the Board of Directors for Canadian Ministries. The same people make decisions as a board and then approve the board decisions as members at an Annual General Meeting that is not open to or accessible to other leaders or members of local churches. While this is technically legal under Canadian charitable laws, it is not considered good governance. In most churches, charities, or civil society organizations, the board of directors is accountable to a broader membership through reporting and questions at an Annual General Meeting.
If there were a regular assembly of Canadians to deliberate and make decisions, there would be more robust discussion between delegates from across the country about directions and priorities for ministry in Canada. Such assemblies could provide both valuable input and more effective accountability for those who serve on the Board of Directors and make decisions between such meetings.
Conflict of Interest in the Exercise of Duty of Care
Members of the Canadian Ministries Board wear two hats. They have a responsibility to protect the best interests of Canadian CRC churches, and they have a responsibility to protect the best interests of the whole Christian Reformed Church of North America (CRCNA). Much of the time those interests may converge. But there are times when the best interests of the two may not be the same. In those moments their first priority is to the whole Council of Delegates, i.e. they are required to go along with a decision of the whole Council, even if there is strong evidence that another decision would serve the interests of Canadian churches better. In 2004, for example, Canadians had developed a strong, reasonable, and feasible ministry plan, to build on momentum developed through a cross-Canada Bike Ride; it was shelved because of financial concerns within the US side of the denomination. The best interests of Canadian churches took a back seat to issues within the US side. That led to the loss of gifted Canadian leaders, loss of momentum through transition between leaders, and restart under a new leader. History shows that cycle has been repeated again and again.
A current example is the inability of the members of the Canadian Ministry Board to seriously consider the merits of separating from the US side. They have acknowledged that speaking in favour of that would constitute a breach of their duty of care to the larger Council of Delegates. They may be genuinely convinced that the binational system serves Canada better; but, if they did not think so, they are unable to pursue their views because it violates their primary duty of care obligation to the Council of Delegates.
We do not need to put people in positions where they have a conflict of interest. Good governance in responsible institutions finds ways to prevent such conflicts of interest. If there were a regular Canadian assembly to deliberate and make decisions for ministry in Canada, the board would have a clearer mandate, more specific directions from a wider membership, and more robust accountability.
Cooperation, under this scenario, would be between two partners, each of whom has clarity in its exercise of its duty of care. The experience of Mennonites and other binational churches that have become distinct churches in the USA and in Canada suggests that cooperation not only continues when there is clarity in duty of care; it grows stronger over time.
Priorities and Allocation of Resources
Changes forced by compliance with the rules of the Canada Revenue Agency have strengthened the role of the Canadian Ministries Board in the direction and control of financial donations made in Canada. Members are assured that new, detailed Joint Ministry Agreements (JMAs) allow the board to trace where every dollar goes. That is a positive change.
This change, and the new pledge system, also makes it easier, from a financial perspective, to make the switch to a Canadian Synod that would determine the direction and priorities for the Canadian resources that already fund Canadian ministries. While more detailed financial analysis is needed, it is reasonable to assume that the 35% of donated resources that go toward the costs of the Office of the General Secretary and Synod would also be adequate to support a Canadian meeting.
While the JMAs give the Canadian Ministries Board direction and control of Canadian donations, the membership has limited information and a very weak understanding of how the allocation of resources follows clearly-established ministry priorities within Canada. CRCNA annual reports provide glimpses of some special ministries in Canada, but larger sums are only reported as part of the binational budget. It is not surprising that many members think their donations go into one big pot in Grand Rapids and Burlington and they have no genuine voice in how their donations are used.
A Canadian Synod would also be made of delegates from classes who have been given authority to make decisions about the direction and priorities for ministry in Canada. The smaller size, the high level of common context and interests, and the ease of on-going connections between sessions suggests more opportunities for meaningful connections between local churches and national ministries, including more ownership and accountability for the allocation and use of resources to achieve common ministry goals.
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